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Abstract 
 
Higher education is increasingly competitive and international in its recruitment of both 
students and faculty, and international ‘league tables’ are increasingly publicised and 
discussed. In many jurisdictions, universities also now have freedom to set fees for at least 
some students, and those with a high reputation are well placed to charge large amounts. 
England has a university sector which is highly differentiated in reputational terms, and a fee 
regime which allows universities to set fees for a large proportion of their students. It is 
therefore possible, using administrative and income data, to examine how far commonly 
recognised measures of reputation explain universities’ teaching income per student, after 
controlling for a wide range of other factors. The results confirm that reputation, or ‘brand’, 
appears to have a very large impact on fee and teaching income, and that it is therefore 
entirely rational for English universities to prioritise activities which raise their international 
visibility and reputation. 
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Introduction 
 
Across most of the world, university enrolments have soared in recent decades, in total 
numbers and as a percentage of the age cohort. There has been a corresponding 
increase in both the number of universities and other tertiary institutions, and in their 
average enrolments. A very large number of students now study outside their countries 
of origin.  (UNESCO, OECD 2015; Altbach and Knight 2007) 
 
Many countries, including those which traditionally made all higher education free at the 
point of use, now charge fees to some or all overseas students. In many, though not all, 
countries, there is also marked and growing internal heterogeneity, with respect to 
institutional status (Wolf 2002, de Burgh et al 2007). 
 
In this environment, there is increasing competition for high-quality and for fee-paying 
students. We hypothesise that individual universities can signal quality to the world 
both individually and through a shared brand; and that the impact of reputation on fee 
income is potentially very large. Recent developments in the UK, and specifically in 
England make it possible to test these hypotheses, and  we offer what we believe to be 
a first direct estimate of the impact of reputation and  ‘brand’ on university finances, and 
specifically on the fee income an institution attracts. 
 
Globally, status differences between national systems and status hierarchies within 
them are both reflected in and reinforced by the growing visibility of international 
‘league tables’ such as those of Times Higher Education and Shanghai Jiao Tong 
University.  Country-specific tables and rankings (such as US News in the USA) have 
existed in a number of countries for many decades, but the visibility and publicity 
accorded to international tables reflects the enormous increase in the numbers of 
students enrolled in universities outside their home country. This in turn has affected 
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organisational incentives and behaviour across the university sector (Hazelkorn, 2015; 
Marginson 2014). 
 
For a university, being highly ranked compared to other national or international 
institutions is obviously highly attractive. A university or college education has always 
been a ‘positional good’, enhancing someone’s position compared to that of others, not 
just a source of concrete skills and knowledge (Frank and Cook 1995; Brown and 
Hesketh 2004).  A growing body of research on wage returns – the extent to which 
degrees are associated with higher lifetime earnings – shows that in many countries 
returns vary significantly by institution, as well as by degree subject (See eg Britton et 
al 2016; https://collegescorecard.ed.gov/). A high ranking should thus make it easier for 
a university to attract good and high-fee-paying students(Wolf 2010; Fumasoli & 
Huisman 2013).  It also offers prima facie evidence to prospective funders that they will 
be buying high-quality research or consultancy.  
 
Universities’ reputations and fortunes do rise and fall (Stone ed 1974): but compared to, 
for example, private companies, they are highly stable. The ‘top’ universities in a 2016 
league table would, to an overwhelming degree, be the same as those which were 
recognised as ‘top’ in 1996, 1946,  or, indeed, 1886. This partly reflects the self-
perpetuating nature of national elites, who tend to be educated in a few easily identified 
institutions (Bourdieu 1977;Wolf 2002) but it is reinforced by the nature of modern 
research. Most government research funding in modern developed countries goes to 
universities and university- affiliated institutes. Much of it is allocated through 
anonymised peer-reviewed proposals: but the allocation of resources across 
institutions is nonetheless likely to be highly stable year on year. The same is true for 
allocation of ‘block’ research funding to institutions on the basis of performance: ‘quality’ 
funding of this type is allocated in the UK but also in, for example, Sweden, and again 
the stability of funding allocations is striking.  Institutions with excellent researchers 
attract research funds, and are also best known to the academics whose judgements 
feed into global league tables: this in turn makes it easier for them to attract more top 
researchers and funding. To those who have it shall be given. 
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Top-rated institutions also, therefore, tend to have high levels of total income in 
absolute and  per-student terms. (Dearden et al 2012) However, the use of research 
funds is often highly restricted, with expenditures confined to specific activities. 
Moreover, pure and applied science research tends to require cross-subsidy in the 
short term, even if it pays dividends in the long-term through its reputational effects 
(Norton 2015).  Internationally renowned ‘research-intensive’ universities are therefore 
concerned to maintain or increase other sources of revenue, just as much as other 
institutions in the sector.  
 
The growing importance of fees 
Globally, the bulk of funding for universities comes from one of two sources: first, 
government grants (direct allocations or direct payment of student fees) and second, 
student fees paid from private income. Consultancy and development work is small in 
volume as a proportion of higher education budgets: in the UK it accounts for well 
under 2%.3 Only in a very few institutions, mostly the top US private not-for-profits, do 
endowments account for a major proportion of annual income. (Wolf 2010) Moreover, 
for the last quarter-century, governments under budgetary pressure have also sought 
ways to increase private contributions to an expanding higher education system 
(Carpentier, 2012).  Today there is a general, though uneven, move away from full 
state funding of students’ studies and towards more of universities’ income coming 
from student fees. 
 
In countries where fees were already standard, notably the US, their real level has 
risen faster than overall spending, so that they play an increasing role in higher 
education budgets. (College Board 2014) In some countries (eg Brazil, Poland, Mexico) 
there has been active encouragement for new private institutions to open to absorb 
student demand. The number of countries subsidising university education for non-
nationals (or, in EU countries, non-EU citizens) has shrunk progressively.  In more and 
more countries, while some fee levels are strictly controlled, others are not.  
                                                        
3 According to HEFCE (2015) consultancy income for the UK university sector in 2013/14 amounted to 
£441m.  This is approximately1.5% of total income for UK universities in that year.  HESA data show that 
total endowment and investment income for UK universities in 2014/15 was £360m, or 1.1% of total income.   
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Overall, therefore, universities in many countries now have a strong incentive to 
increase the number and proportion of students in groups for which fees are not set by 
government, and to charge them fees that are as high as possible. The money raised in 
this way will affect, directly and indirectly, the teaching programmes that students 
receive: but it is also, unlike most research grants, highly fungible, and available for use 
as the institution wishes – including to subsidise research.    
 
Given the importance of resourcing to universities, there is surprisingly little 
comparative or longitudinal research on the factors which tend to increase, or decrease, 
the fees charged to students – or, indeed, the level of direct government grants. The 
largest body of empirical work relates to the USA, where provision of higher education 
(and indeed all education)  is a state rather than a federal responsibility. Funding levels 
here are ‘pro-cyclical’: that is,  total and per-student appropriations for higher education 
institutions rise faster than other budget categories when the economy is strong and tax 
receipts high, and are more likely to be cut than other budget categories during 
recessionary periods. (Hovey 1999, Humphreys 2004.)  
 
Appropriation levels are also affected by which party is in power, with Republican 
legislatures and governors associated with lower spending than Democratic-controlled 
ones. (McLendon et al, 2009; Delaney and Doyle 2011). Capital expenditures, which 
are again a state concern, are also heavily affected by levels of racial heterogeneity 
within the state, and by other political factors: notably levels of higher education 
lobbying and the extent to which legislators are ‘professionalised’,  i.e. typically serving 
long terms, with professional office staff and a dense web of contacts with constituents 
and interest groups (Tandberg and Ness, 2011).    
 
In the highly centralised UK, education spending decisions rest with central government, 
although spending on higher education is a devolved function, with the Scottish, Welsh 
and Northern Irish governments taking their own  spending decisions within a devolved 
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education budget4  (Dearden et al 2012). Analysis of budgetary allocations 
demonstrates that health spending is consistently protected (and real growth 
maintained), and that higher education spending is, in contrast, much more volatile 
(Uberoi et al 2009). Spending levels do not follow the same symmetrical ‘balance-
wheel’ pattern found in US State legislatures. 
 
How do students decide which institutions to attend, and where it is worth paying 
more?  Although governments in some countries are trying to provide more information 
to potential students, notably through satisfaction surveys and information on wage 
returns (inevitably highly lagged), students are in a situation where information is highly 
imperfect.   Universities consequently strive  to signal that they are highly desirable 
destinations – and have an especially strong incentive to reach and resonate with 
candidates for high-fee options.  Observers of contemporary higher education 
frequently draw a distinction between ‘recruiting’ and ‘selective’ institutions. The former 
are keen to accept any applicant who meets the basic entry criteria, their major concern 
being to fill courses. The latter face substantial numbers of applicants for each place. If 
‘selective’  universities are permitted, by their governments, to set their own fee levels, 
they are also, therefore, in a good position to charge higher fees in the confident 
expectation that they will maintain their desirability if they do (Bowl and Hughes, 2016).  
 
The strategies which are available to university leaders can be analysed clearly using a 
resource-based perspective (the “Resource Based View”, or RBV: see Wernerfelt 1984, 
Bryson et al 2007). The institution highlights and tries to build on its competitive 
advantages compared to other HEIs. Among these advantages, reputation (national 
and international) is a crucial consideration.  
 
Contemporary university leaders are highly pre-occupied with acquiring prestige for 
their institution as best they can. The dynamic relationship between research 
excellence, research income, prestige and desirability is well understood and 
                                                        
4 Decisions for England  and English higher education have been taken by the UK Parliament,  including  MPs 
from the devolved nations, although legislation pertaining entirely to England is in principle now decided by 
MPs with English seats. 
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expressed (Blackmore 2016a, 2016b) but the relationship between reputation and fee 
income is less often discussed.  However, not only is a ‘selective’ university in a very 
good position to charge high fees. We also have evidence that a higher price is 
recognised and treated as an (imperfect)  indicator of quality in itself. A number of 
institutions (notably George Washington University in the US) are well known in the 
sector for using price increases as a way of driving up their reputation successfully 
(Calvert 2015). US-wide data confirm that this strategy, while not universally successful, 
often is effective (Askin and Bothner 2016). 
 
In this paper, we look at the impact on English universities’ fee income of a number of 
factors, including indicators of reputation. We hypothesise that the impact of reputation 
on fee income is potentially very large. Recent developments in the UK, and specifically 
in England, make it possible to test this hypothesis,  providing what we believe to be a 
first estimate of the direct impact of reputation and  ‘brand’ on university finances. 
 
Higher education in contemporary England 
The English university sector , like all higher education systems,  is highly regulated, 
with a number of price controls in place. But over the last few decades, controls have 
been raised or removed in a number of key respects (most fees, most recruitment 
numbers): and lifted differently for English universities than for those of Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland.5 
 
Between the end of the Second World War and the early 1990s, the UK had a largely 
unified university sector. Total student numbers grew, at accelerating speed, over that 
period as did the number of universities: at the same time the polytechnic sector was 
created and expanded, offering degrees validated through a central body, the CNAA 
(Council for National Academic Awards.)  In 1992, the UK became one of the few 
countries to abolish any distinction between universities and higher technical 
institutions, with polytechnics gaining full university status in 1992, and greatly 
increasing institutional numbers. (In most other developed countries, the tertiary system 
                                                        
5 This often involved a process of first becoming a university college.  
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remains segmented). Since then, other institutions – notably colleges of further and 
higher education, and specialist institutes – have also received degree awarding 
powers and in many cases moved to full university status.6  
 
Until the late 1990s, degree study remained free at the point of use, and there were 
also generous maintenance grants linked to family income (Harrison and Hatt, 2012). 
Student numbers were capped at institutional level: a university received a fixed 
allocation of undergraduate places for which the government paid, and was severely 
penalised if it offered additional places to fee-paying home applicants. (Aldrich ed 
2002) Postgraduate places for home students were also strictly controlled and 
generously funded. (Home students, in a higher education context, covers all EU 
citizens, who must all, under EU law, be treated the same as a EU member’s 
nationals.) 
 
Until 1981, all overseas students who received a university place were funded in the 
same way (and so received free higher education tuition) as home students. Today, 
universities can not only recruit as many ‘international’ (non EU) students as they wish 
at all levels, but also decide what to charge them. This led to a rapid increase in 
overseas students and overseas fee income.  By 2007-8, 16% of overall teaching and 
tuition revenue in both England and Scotland derived from international (non-EU) 
students (Dearden et al 2012). By 2013/14 this had risen to 24% in England and 27% 
in Scotland.   
 
Continued rapid expansion of places for home students was secured, for many years, 
by reducing spending per student. However, by the end of the 1990s, there was cross-
party consensus that some form of fee or charge for home students was necessary to 
supplement government spending: Lord Dearing duly delivered a report recommending 
a form of flat-rate ‘contribution’  on the eve of the 1997 election.  Fees were then 
                                                        
6 While many countries have allowed or encouraged the development of a sizeable private sector alongside 
the pre-existing public one, this has not yet happened in England, although the current government (2016) is 
promoting such a development (BIS 2016).   
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introduced by the incoming Labour government, albeit initially at the very low level of  
£1,000 a year (Dearing 1997, Aldrich op cit).7 
 
Over the next two decades, the UK, and, in an increasingly devolved UK, the English 
government specifically, moved to increase student fees absolutely and as a proportion 
of universities’ overall income. English fees for home (ie all EU)  undergraduates were 
increased  (though their level was controlled): the maximum annual fee rose to £3000 
for those enrolling in 2006-7 and to £9000 a year in 2012-13. (Scottish, Welsh and 
Northern Irish charging policies now diverge markedly from England’s.)  
 
Students are not required to pay these fees upfront, but instead are eligible for an 
income-contingent loan from the government-backed Student Loan Company, 
repayable as and when their earnings exceed a certain amount. And at present 
(2015/16) only 7 out of all the 120 universities in England and Wales offer any 
undergraduate courses at less than £9000 a year (Complete University Guide 2016). 
Recent budget announcements extend this system to include loans for masters and 
doctoral degrees. 
 
Until fees moved to £9000 a year, the government had also contributed directly to all 
full-time home undergraduate provision, but from that time onwards governmental 
contributions were retained only for a limited sub-set of degrees. 8In an additional major 
change,  England also recently abolished the caps on ‘home’ undergraduate student 
numbers which had been applied to individual institutions and to the system overall. 9  
                                                        
7 What was actually implemented differed from what had originally been recommended by Dearing – see e.g. 
Palfreyman and Tapper, (2014) for details.   
8  Lab sciences, engineering and other technical degrees, and specific ‘Strategically Important and Vulnerable 
Subjects’, as identified by the Funding Council 
9 This involved an early stage, in which caps were lifted only for the most academically qualified students, 
but is now universal. 
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Any ‘home’ undergraduate accepted by an English university is now eligible for an 
income-contingent student loan. 
 
System differentiation 
Global league tables show the UK, and England, to be very strongly represented at the 
top. In addition to those found in ‘top 20’ or ‘top 50’ lists, other UK institutions are found 
scattered throughout the top 200 or top 500 lists: conversely, many others do not 
appear at all. There is also a high level of variability in universities’ income from 
research council and other research funding; and  also in the judgements of research 
quality produced by the formal evaluations run every few  years (known as the 
Research Selectivity Exercise in  1986 and 1989, the Research Assessment Exercise 
in 1992, 1996, 2001 and 2008, and the Research Excellence Framework in 2015), and 
which determine the allocation of government block grants for the support of research 
and related infrastructure.Overall,  
 
there are marked differences in research funding patterns between all the ‘pre-1992’ 
universities (Russell Group and non-Russell Group) and both the ex-polytechnics and 
the most recent universities.  
 
In recent years, there has been a number of attempts by universities of similar types to 
group together to promote their common interests. By far the most visible of these 
groupings, indeed the only one recognised by the general public, is that of the ‘Russell  
Group’. This is a grouping of 24 large research-intensive universities, a sub-set of the 
‘pre-1992’ universities, including two in Scotland, and one each in Wales and Northern 
Ireland . There are also five in London: four are, and one was till recently, a member of 
the federated University of London (a grouping recently joined by another of the 
capital’s universities (City University), which saw and sought University of London 
membership as a signal of quality). It is increasingly common in the press, as well as in 
schools’ own reporting, to refer to numbers of school-leavers progressing to a ‘Russell 
Group’ university as a sign of academic success. The emergence of this grouping 
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allows one to examine whether or not  group membership or brand affects a UK 
university’s fortunes over and above its individual characteristics. 
 
When the English government lifted the cap on home undergraduate numbers, there 
was considerable uncertainty about whether over-subscribed ‘selective’ universities 
would increase their numbers substantially. In fact, many have, with very rapid ‘home’ 
undergraduate growth in a number of institutions belonging to the Russell Group. While 
recent changes do not allow different universities to charge different amounts for such 
students – the £9000 cap remains – the combination of unrestricted admissions and a 
much-increased fee level introduce new options for English universities’ income-
generation strategies. 
 
Measuring success in generating fee income 
In an environment where fee income is very important to universities,  we have 
suggested that an institution’s leaders will attempt to increase it  by highlighting and 
building on its competitive advantages. What is the best measure of their success or 
failure?  
 
For most conventional businesses, a number of well-recognised measures of 
performance are preferred (eg gross profit margin, return on invested capital, market 
share),  but these are inappropriate for the vast bulk of English universities, which are 
not profit-making, but rather charities, and which are also aiming to maximise a number 
of outcomes simultaneously (Labib et al, 2014).  One possibly appropriate measure is 
total financial resource, total income, or alternatively, in this context, total teaching 
income.  Total income is not normally seen as an appropriate measure of success by 
business analysts, regardless of costs/expenditures. But in the distinctive competitive 
global environment we have described, size – of institution and of income -  has 
arguably become increasingly important because it allows for a wide range of large 
research  undertakings. 
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However, although there has been a general increase in the size of higher education 
institutions, they remain highly variable. Internationally,  some very small institutions 
(eg Caltech) are also highly successful and respected. Amongst all HE institutions in 
England FTE student numbers in 2014/15 ranged from 177 at the Institute of Cancer 
Research to 67,361 at the Open University. For the sample of 97 universities which are 
the main focus of our analysis,  the range was from 1,547 (Buckingham) to 35,370 
(Manchester).   
 
Income-per-student is therefore a preferable measure to total income, and is used in 
this paper.  In the following sections we explore the determinants of teaching-income-
per-student across the English university sector and examine whether they support our 
hypothesis that reputation and brand have a major impact on teaching income. 
 
Explaining teaching income per student 
 
We use data on HE institutions from the Higher Education Statistics Agency (HESA), 
the official source of quantitative information about higher education in the UK.  We 
therefore exclude so-called ‘alternative providers,’ who are not universities but provide 
higher education, due to a lack of data.  There are around 200 HE institutions in the 
HESA data base.  Our focus is on (a) generalist universities which (b) faced the same 
strategic opportunities and limitations as the large majority of the sector during the 
period 2007-14. In order to investigate the impact of a range of  factors on a university’s 
teaching income per student, we needed to exclude both individually distinctive 
institutions which faced a recruiting environment quite different from that of the sector 
at large, and those for whom the reputational influences important to most institutions 
(eg international research and league table rankings) were not applicable. 
 
We therefore excluded a number of specialist providers such as agricultural colleges, 
the Royal College of Art, the Royal College of Music, the Royal Conservatoire of 
Scotland,  and University of London Institutes (such as the Warburg Institute).  Further, 
to create a sample made up of generalist universities, we determined that institutions 
should be eligible for Student Loan Company funding; they should not be exclusively 
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postgraduate; they should be sizeable institutions having at least 1,000 
undergraduates; at least 75% of those undergraduates should be doing full degrees, 
and at least 60% of undergraduates should be studying full-time.  These criteria 
exclude a few additional and unusual institutions such as the Open University (part-
time distance learners), Birkbeck (part-time students), LSHTM, London Business 
School and Cranfield (graduate only).  Following these exclusions,  a large sample of 
120 UK HE institutions with full HESA data remains. 
 
At present, teaching income per student varies very markedly. This is shown in Figure 
1 for the UK and for England separately.  (The shaded boxes indicating the spread 
between the first and third quartiles.) In both 2007-8 and 2013-14 (the most recent 
complete data), a very wide spread is evident, even excluding outliers. In the more 
recent data a spread of over 2:1 (UK) and almost 2:1 (England) for the main population 
underlines the major differences in per-student resource that obtain in the sector; 
overall, the  spread was almost threefold - from almost £12,000 per full--time equivalent 
student to just over (England) or just under £4000 (UK)  - in 2007-8. By 2013-14, 
English figures were a little more bunched but still ranged from a teaching income per 
student of just over £6000 to one of well over £16000 per student.  
 
To explain these differences, we looked to identify structural variables, which in varying 
degrees might be (a) beyond individual institutions’ control, and/or (b) affected directly 
by strategic decisions made by management, and also (c) a number of ‘reputational’ 
indicators.  
 
The most important structural variable during the period in question was the fee regime 
for undergraduates. All parts of the UK treat all higher education institutions (other than 
‘alternative providers’) in their jurisdiction alike with respect to the support they receive 
for ‘Home’ (EU) students. (Wales and Scotland treat Welsh and Scottish-domiciled 
students different from other UK ones, but they do so consistently across Wales and 
Scotland.)   From 2000 onwards, and even more markedly from 2010, this resulted in a 
large difference in the teaching income received per Home undergraduate in the UK’s 
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different devolved administrations , and most especially in English as opposed to 
Scottish universities.  
 
Historically, Scottish universities enjoyed higher funding-per-student than English ones, 
largely because they enrolled proportionately more science and medical students 
(Dearden et al 2012), but this is no longer the case. As a result of diverging fee policies, 
in every one of our models which included nation, being in England was a highly 
significant and substantively important explanatory variable. We provide some results 
in the Appendix for the UK which illustrate the impact of nationality. However, since our 
focus here is on institutional strategy and prestige, and universities cannot simply move 
country within the UK, the rest of the analysis in the main body of the paper is for 
English institutions alone, of which 97 meet our criteria for inclusion. 
 
We hypothesise that the following might affect levels of teaching income per student: 
The academic composition of the student body. More financial support is received from 
government for STEM students, and for medical students, than for students of other 
subjects, so the larger the proportion of such students, the higher the average teaching 
income per student. 
 
The size of the university. Larger institutions may find it easier to respond quickly and 
easily to changes in student demand and in government policy, and so increase their 
income per student. 
 
Rate of growth of the university. It is easier to expand course enrolments and add new 
ones than it is to shrink existing ones, especially if overall demand is high across all 
subjects (as is likely in ‘selective’ institutions).  Institutions with effective senior 
management teams which respond to and take advantage of changes in demand and 
policy may thus opt for increasing overall size . Such institutions will be identified by 
student growth at undergraduate level, postgraduate level, or both.  
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Location  Some regions of the country may be more or less attractive to high-fee 
students because of housing costs (reducing the pull of high-cost areas) or labour 
market factors (increasing the pull of high-cost areas) or by other regionally-related 
factors (eg access to airports). 
 
Undergraduate/postgraduate mix  While home undergraduate fees are highly regulated, 
most home postgraduate fees are not. Moreover, substantial numbers of international 
students are found at postgraduate level. Institutions which have made a strategic 
decision to move into increasing the proportion of postgraduates may therefore find this 
associated with higher per-student teaching income.  
 
Internationalisation of the student body   All fees for non-EU students are unregulated. 
Data show that, across the whole sector, the average level of funding received per non-
EU student is well above the average teaching income per EU student. (Dearden et al 
op cit: 85)  Institutions that have higher proportions of international students in their 
student body may therefore have higher per-student teaching income than those with 
lower proportions. 
 
Governmental measures of student satisfaction   Since  2004 the National Student 
Survey (run for the Funding Councils) has collected responses from final-year 
undergraduate students, asking them to rate their experiences on a number of 
dimensions, including specific questions about teaching and assessment, and an 
overall rating of their course. The results are available on line, on an institutional basis, 
and also used by external commentators. 
 
UK university rankings 
A number of publications rank UK universities, of which the best known and most 
visible The Guardian newspaper. It weights NSS scores heavily and concentrates on 
indicators other than research.   
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UK government research rankings 
The UK government operates a system of ‘dual funding’ for universities: teaching 
payments are run by the devolved governments, and there is a ‘block grant’ for 
research based on quality, and allocated on the basis of a UK-wide assessment. The 
2008 assessment was called the ‘Research Assessment Exercise’ and the 2014 one 
was the ‘Research Excellence Framework’. University rankings on these are widely 
reported and likely to be strongly associated with reputation and we hypothesise that 
this will translate into higher fees.  
 
UK university type or brand 
There are three important and generally recognised categories with which an institution 
can be associated, and which may have clear reputational consequences: ‘Russell 
Group’, other ‘pre-1992’ institution, and ‘post-1992’. We hypothesise that the group to 
which a university belongs functions as a brand, with Russell Group institutions able to 
charge the highest fees by dint of their membership, and other pre-92 institutions able 
to charge more than post-92, but significantly less than Russell Group members.  
 
Global reputation rankings 
A number of global league tables exist, as noted above. One of the best-known is the 
Times Higher, which also uses a wider set of criteria than the Jiao Tong or QS rankings 
(also frequently cited), and is therefore less likely to be very highly correlated with UK 
governmental research rankings. The THE World Rankings list 800 institutions, but we 
look separately at the impact of being in a number of different positions in the ranks. 
We hypothesise that,  because ‘brand-related’ ability to charge can only apply in a 
limited number of cases, where the institution appears to have global name recognition, 
the positive impact of global rankings on fee levels (and  teaching-income-per student) 
will be limited to universities in the top 200 places. 
 
As noted above, we divided the sample into three groups, using a classification which 
is widely used and recognised in the UK university community: Russell Group, other 
pre-92, and post-92 (new universities). Figure 2 shows that there is, as we expect, a 
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marked difference between these three groups in teaching income per student, and 
almost no overlap at all between Russell Group and post-92 institutions. 
 
Data 
HESA collects a wide range of data including financial information such as the income 
and expenditure of higher education institutions, as well as data on numbers and types 
of staff and students.  Our data were obtained via HEIDI, the Higher Education 
Information Database for Institutions, which is HESA’s web-based management 
information service. 
 
The variable we are principally interested in explaining is teaching income per student 
(for the year 2013/14). The teaching income variable was constructed from HESA 
financial data and it was constructed by adding together the recurrent teaching grant 
distributed by the Higher Education Funding Council for England (HEFCE) and total 
tuition fee income.   The teaching grant figure is the amount distributed to each 
institution by HEFCE as shown in the annual grant letter.  Tuition fee income includes 
all income received in respect of fees for students on all courses for which fees are 
charged, including sources such as the Student Loans Company (SLC), Local 
Education Authorities (LEA), the Department of Health and other sources, as well as 
from individual students.  The two sources of income were added together to yield total 
teaching income for each university.  Teaching income per student was then 
constructed by dividing teaching income in 2013/14 by the number of FTE students in 
2013/14. 
 
As for explanatory predictors, a number of derived variables were created from the 
student data in the HEIDI database including the proportion of non-EU international 
students, the percentage of postgraduate students in total FTE student numbers, the 
growth of overall student numbers from 2007/08 to 2013/14, the growth of 
undergraduate numbers from 2007/08 to 2013/14 and the growth of postgraduate 
numbers over the same period.  To measure the student mix at an institution we used 
the proportion of STEM students.  Several definitions were experimented with here, 
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including a narrow definition, the proportion of all students doing physics or maths 
degree, and a much broader definition  - the proportion studying for degrees in biology, 
physics, maths, computing or engineering).   In addition, a binary variable for the 
presence of a medical school was created drawing on information from the UK Medical 
Schools Council.  It takes the value 1 if a university has a medical school and 0 if the 
university does not have a medical school.  We constructed a binary variable for 
whether or not the university is in the Greater London area, and a categorical variable 
for type of university distinguishing three types of university – Russell Group, other pre-
92 universities, post-92 universities.  
 
Our dataset was augmented with further data from a range of sources.  As a measure 
of student satisfaction we used information from the National Student Survey (NSS).  
Specifically the percentage of respondents who 'definitely' or 'mostly' agreed with the 
statement 'Overall, I am satisfied with the quality of my course' was used.  Rather than 
contemporaneous data, we used data from the 2011 survey since (we presume) high 
satisfaction scores would impact on demand a few years hence.  We also utilised data 
from the 2012 Guardian ranking of universities.  The Guardian rankings focus on 
teaching (both inputs such as the staff/student ratio and outputs such as satisfaction 
scores and job prospects) but do not include any measures of research. On research, 
we used the 2008 RAE results aggregated to university level with an overall ranking 
based on grade-point average.  For the variable using Times Higher world rankings of 
universities,  English universities were classified according to whether they were in the 
top 50 in these rankings, 51 to 100 etc down to 601 to 800 and unranked.  The most 
recent data (2015/16) were preferred because earlier years have far fewer 
observations (for example in 2012/13 only rankings for the top 400 were given).   
 
Method 
Our interest is in the relationships between teaching income per student on the one 
hand and a set of explanatory variables on the other. However, prior to analysis we 
spent some time examining the data via univariate summary statistics including 
measures of central tendency and dispersion; and then bivariate correlations, scatter 
plots and box plots to explore the relationships between the variables in our dataset.    
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Such exploratory analysis can provide useful insights and informed decisions on 
whether or not to retain all variables.   
 
The method used in this paper is multiple linear regression analysis. This is a standard 
way of examining how a set of explanatory variables are related to a quantitative 
response variable: in this case, teaching income per student.  Multiple regression  
enables the researcher to control for a range of variables when examining the key 
relationship of interest. After controlling for lots of other factors which might influence 
teaching income per student, is there a statistically significant relationship with a 
particular variable of interest: in this case, measures of reputation or brand, such  as 
type of university? There are various types of regression analysis and their 
appropriateness depends on the form of the outcome variable. With outcomes 
measured on a continuous scale, such as teaching income per student, multiple linear 
regression is appropriate.   
 
In all of our regression models the response variable is teaching income per student in 
2013/14, as defined previously (see Data section).  We start with models containing 
few explanatory variables, and add further variables in stages.  The modelling process 
was sequential, dropping variables which were not statistically significant at each stage 
in order to arrive at a relatively simple model containing key predictor variables.  An 
assumption underlying basic forms of linear regression analysis is that the variance of 
the residuals is constant across all observation points.  Our exploratory plots suggested 
that this assumption did not hold, in other words that the variance of residuals may be 
heteroscedastic.  To allow for this, heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors can be 
used to allow for non-constant variance (Fox, 2016) and that is what we did for all our 
models.  
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Results 
Bivariate correlations 
As a first step in the analysis, we examined bivariate correlations to look at whether 
there was a correlation between each of the possible explanatory variables, taken 
separately, and the dependent variable (teaching-income per student).  Pearson 
correlation coefficients were used for the continuous and categorical explanatory 
variables, and point-biserial correlations for dichotomous explanatory variables.   
 
There were high Pearson correlation coefficients between teaching-income per student 
and the student and subject mix variables.  The correlation with the dependent variable 
was 0.84 for the proportion of international students and 0.63 for the percentage of 
STEM students.  Both of the dichotomous variables had moderate point-biserial 
correlations with the dependent variable; r = 0.38 for the London variable, and r = 0.57 
for the presence of a medical school.  The size and growth of universities had low 
correlations with teaching income per student.  The number of FTE students had a 
correlation of 0.22 with teaching income per student, while for each of overall growth, 
the growth of undergraduates and of postgraduates the correlation coefficients with 
teaching income per student were less than 0.2.  The correlation of UK satisfaction and 
quality scores with teaching income per student were r = 0.75 for the Guardian score 
and 0.39 for the NSS score.  The correlations with teaching income per student for 
measures of UK research strength and global prestige  were r = -0.75 for 2008 RAE 
ranking, and r = -0.72 for the categorical THE world ranking (where 1 is the top rank).  
All these variables were retained. However percentage of postgraduates was dropped 
as a separate explanatory variable because of its high correlation with the proportion of 
international students  (r = 0.78) ]  
 
Regression analysis of teaching income per student 
In Table 1 we report a first set of regression results.  The dependent variable 
throughout is teaching income per student in 2013/14 for our sample of 96 English 
universities.  The results in this table focus on type of university and measures of 
student mix and subject mix as explanatory variables. Model 1 in Table 1 just has type 
of university as the sole explanatory variable.  The reference category is the ‘other pre-
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92’ type of university and, relative to them, Russell Group universities had, on average, 
more than £2,000 of additional teaching income per student in 2013/14 while the post-
92 universities had almost £1,500 less than the other pre-92 universities on average.  It 
is worth noting that the R2 in this regression is 0.58, suggesting that 58% of the 
variation can be accounted for by the  categorical variable for type of university.  The 
remaining models in Table 1 add the proportion of STEM students and the proportion of 
international (non-EU) students to the regression analysis.  The proportion of 
international students was highly significant (p < 0.001) but the STEM variable was not 
statistically significant . This was surprising, since it was the major factor explaining 
differences between English and Scottish universities’ teaching income in the period 
1995-2007 – i.e. immediately before the period we are examining (Dearden et al, 2012).  
We retain the STEM variable in the model in order to check whether or not it will 
become significant as further variables are added to the model.   
 
In further regression analyses (Table 2) we added binary variables for whether the 
university has a medical school and whether the university is in London.  Results 
showed that being in London was strongly and positively associated with teaching 
income per student even after controlling for other factors such as type of university, 
student and subject mix (p < 0.001).  Other things equal, universities in London had 
approximately £900 per student more teaching income after allowing for other variables 
in the regression model.  However, the presence of a medical school was not 
statistically significant in any of our regression models, most likely because most of the 
medical schools are in certain types of university and that is already included as a 
control in our models.  So we retained the binary variable for London in further models 
but omitted the medical school variable.   
 
We also considered whether the size and growth of universities – measured in terms of 
FTE students numbers and with growth measured over the period 2007/08 to 2013/14 
– were associated with teaching income per student (Table 3).  We explored several 
growth variables, including overall student numbers, and the growth of undergraduate 
and postgraduate student numbers, but none of them were statistically significant in 
models which controlled for other factors.  However, the size of the university was 
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significantly associated with teaching income per student even in models which 
controlled for other factors.  The predicted impact of size of university on teaching 
income per student was quite small but the association was a strong one (p < 0.01).    
The main new feature of Table 4 is that we have now included each university’s 2008 
RAE rank as an explanatory variable. (Note that the highest-ranking institution will 
score 1 on this variable, so we expect a negative correlation.)  The first specification in 
Table 4 has this as the sole explanatory variable and then in Models 2-5 we add further 
variables to the model.    While Model 1 shows a positive relationship between RAE 
ranking and teaching income per student, the effect size is small, and  as we added 
type of university, dummy variable for London and variables reflecting student mix, 
subject mix and size of university to the model the effect size of the RAE variable 
became progressively smaller and in Models 4 and 5 it was no longer statistically 
significant.  That is, we could no longer reject the null hypothesis of no association 
between teaching income per student in 2013/14 and RAE 2008 ranking.   
 
We investigated the impact of NSS scores and Guardian scores on teaching income 
per student.  As can be seen in Table 5, each of these variables was significantly 
associated with teaching income per student when no controls were in the model, 
although the effect sizes were small; but became insignificant once we controlled for 
other factors which may influence teaching income per student. Being a Russell Group 
member and being in London both have a very large effect on teaching income per 
student in these specifications. 
 
Finally, we explored the association between the Times Higher world rankings and 
teaching income per student (Table 6).  In the absence of any other explanatory 
variables an English university being in the top 50 of these rankings predicted 
approximately an additional £5,600 of teaching income per student.  Being inside the 
top 200 was also significant and worth nearly £2,200 per student in this initial model.  
Adding further explanatory variables reduced the size and significance of the ranking 
variable.  However, it was correlated with other explanatory variables, especially 
university type: Russell Group members, for example, are very likely indeed to achieve 
high rankings. This makes it difficult to tease out any effects independently of each 
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other and to know how much, for example,  the Group ‘brand’ adds to the impact of 
world rankings.   
 
As discussed above, we have focused on English universities in our analyses here.  
We also ran some models for the UK as a whole, with a sample of 127 universities, and 
these results, which were broadly very similar, are included for interest in the Appendix.   
 
Conclusion 
The implications of the models which we have displayed in this paper are that 
universities in the Russell Group are able to generate substantively higher levels of 
teaching income per student than other English universities partly due to a more 
favourable student mix but also, and to a highly significant degree, as a result of their 
status as established, elite, research-intensive universities which figure large in 
international rankings. While it is generally accepted that reputation is important to 
individual institutions as well as to English higher education overall, our analysis 
indicates that it is worth a very large amount of money indeed – and also that other 
‘reputational’ and non-reputational factors, such as National Student Survey scores, or 
undergraduate/postgraduate mix, are not important. 
 
As shown in Table 7, England’s Russell Group universities differ markedly from other 
pre-92 universities in both their proportion of STEM students and in the proportion of 
international (non-EU) students they enrol. Both these factors in themselves will tend to 
raise teaching income-per-student: the former because of direct government funding for 
home STEM students, the latter because international students are almost invariably 
charged more than home students. However, what our models indicate is that a large 
part of the Russell Group advantage cannot be explained by these factors.  
 
In our final regression models, for example, being a highly-ranked university 
internationally (as most Russell Group institutions are), and being a member of the 
group, are associated with increases in per-student teaching income of several 
thousand pounds even when we control for STEM and international student 
representation. Given that home (EU) undergraduate fees are controlled, what this 
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means in effect is that highly-ranked and ‘top-branded’ universities are able to charge 
very high fees for that proportion of their student body where fees are uncontrolled.  
 
What are the implications of these findings for university leaders making strategic 
decisions about the future direction of their institution? Specifically, what might the 
leader of a university outside of the Russell Group do to boost teaching income per 
student?  What are the strategic options available, and how effective would they be?   
Let us assume that the actual state of the world to be faced by this university is 
represented by the relatively simple model of Table 1, Model 4.  Here, each extra 
percentage point of STEM students among the student body boosts teaching income 
per student by £34, each additional percentage point of non-EU students among the 
total boosts teaching income per student by about £128.  There is a substantial 
premium of almost £1,400 for being in the Russell Group.  This represents either the 
power of the Russell Group brand as such or, perhaps more plausibly, is also proxying 
for some combination of prestige, reputation, research-intensity etc. 
 
Some predictions from this model are shown in Figure 3.  Here, we are assuming that 
there are three hypothetical universities, one of each type, each of which has the mean 
proportions of international and STEM students for their sector, as listed in Table 5.  
The model then predicts that teaching income per student will be £11,609 for the 
Russell Group university, £9,565 for the other pre-92 university  and £8,069 for the 
post-92 university.  
 
Now, we explore some hypothetical scenarios and their predicted outcomes – via 
altering student mix or subject mix, or somehow gaining prestige to the level of the 
Russell Group sector – as listed in Table 8.   Under Scenario 1, boosting the proportion 
of STEM students to the Russell Group average, the other pre-92 university would 
realise a rather slight gain in teaching income per student of some £175 (£9,740 - 
£9,565), taking it to almost 84 per cent of the Russell Group average (as shown in 
Table 9).  As its starting point for the proportion of STEM students is much further away 
from the Russell Group average, the increment for the post-92 university would be 
larger at £375 (£8,444 minus £8,069), but this is still a fairly modest gain.  The reason 
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of course is that each extra STEM student delivers only a small addition to income in 
the underlying statistical model.   
 
Scenario 2, in which the universities attain the Russell Group average on the proportion 
of international (non-EU) students delivers more substantial gains in teaching income 
per student.  This is especially true for the post-92 university which, starting as it does 
with a much lower base of these financially valuable international students, would see 
its teaching income per student rise by almost a quarter.  And under Scenario 3, in 
which the proportions of both STEM and non-EU students are boosted to the Russell 
Group average, teaching income per student would be 29 per cent higher in the post-
92 university.   
 
The gains in teaching income per student achieved under these scenarios by the pre-
92 university are predicted to be much more modest – an increase of some 5 per cent 
under Scenario 2 and about 7 per cent for Scenario 3.  The pre-92 university starts out 
much closer to its Russell Group counterpart on student and subject mix and therefore 
gains relatively little extra income from being boosted to the Russell Group average. 
The pre-92 university gains far more from being able to hypothetically ‘join’ the Russell 
Group, in Scenario 4.  Even if its student and subject mix were entirely unaffected by 
this transition – as, in the interest of simplicity, the model predicts- it would still be on 94 
per cent of the average level of teaching income per student of the Russell Group, or a 
gain of almost £1,400 per student.  The post-92 university would also gain substantially, 
by over £1,000 per student but would still, on this scenario, be well below (in fact at 
about 80 per cent) of the level of teaching income per student in true Russell Group 
universities due to its much less favourable mix of subjects and the relative scarcity of 
high-fee-paying international students on its campus.   
 
Of course, joining the Group would, in the real world, also in all likelihood lead to more 
international students as well. But even within the simplifying constraints introduced by 
our scenario assumptions, the results underline the value of prestige, which is itself 
inherently unequal in its distribution. They also confirm that the incentive for universities 
to prioritise those activities which feed into reputation and brand is extremely strong. 
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For the foreseeable future,  prioritising research and other internationally visible 
activities is likely to pay far greater dividends than any other available strategy.   
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Figure 1a: teaching income per student 2007-8 
 
Figure 1b Teaching income per student 2013-14 
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Figure 2: Teaching income (recurrent + fees) per student 2013/14, English universities 
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Figure 3: Model predictions 
 
 Table 1: Regression models for 
teaching income per student in 
2013/14, English universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of university (reference: other pre-92 university) 
Russell Group  2044.136*** 1783.492*** 1564.603*** 1394.198*** 
 (3.99) (3.59) (4.55) (4.44) 
     
Post-92 university -1495.483*** -1197.219** 19.692 205.195 
 (-5.50) (-2.95) (0.06) (0.54) 
     
percentage of STEM in 
total FTE students 
(narrow defn) 
 50.452  33.897 
  (1.16)  (0.99) 
     
proportion 
international (non-EU) 
students 
  129.293*** 128.022*** 
   (6.52) (6.23) 
     
Constant 9564.837*** 9115.999*** 6956.678*** 6680.752*** 
 (38.26) (17.80) (16.56) (12.68) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.581 0.590 0.790 0.794 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
 
Table 2: Regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, English universities 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Russell Group 
university 
 2059.941** 2044.136*** 1400.844*** 1391.264*** 1288.663*** 
  (2.70) (4.65) (3.75) (4.74) (3.50) 
       
Post-92 university  -1500.281*** -1359.885*** 203.930 126.237 143.481 
  (-4.91) (-5.41) (0.54) (0.39) (0.44) 
       
Medical school  -26.341  -13.022  200.877 
  (-0.04)  (-0.03)  (0.55) 
       
London   1518.707***  901.611*** 927.503*** 
   (3.88)  (3.62) (3.70) 
       
percentage of STEM in 
total FTE students 
(narrow defn) 
   34.145 50.102 46.743 
    (0.97) (1.60) (1.48) 
       
proportion 
international (non-EU) 
students 
   127.991*** 106.240*** 106.087*** 
    (6.27) (5.91) (5.70) 
       
Constant  9570.105*** 9185.160*** 6681.768*** 6750.578*** 6736.908*** 
  (32.66) (38.94) (12.74) (14.98) (14.80) 
Observations  96 96 96 96 96 
R2  0.581 0.688 0.794 0.825 0.826 
t statistics in parentheses 
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* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table 3: Regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, English universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Russell Group university 1391.264*** 1676.520*** 1426.260*** 1420.975*** 1416.632*** 
 (4.74) (5.25) (4.77) (4.87) (4.76) 
Post-92 university 126.237 401.006 113.451 111.751 115.220 
 (0.39) (1.17) (0.35) (0.35) (0.36) 
percentage of STEM in total FTE 
students (narrow defn) 
50.102 70.730* 46.697 46.089 47.570 
 (1.60) (2.30) (1.43) (1.46) (1.46) 
proportion international (non-
EU) students 
106.240*** 114.395*** 108.039*** 107.562*** 107.880*** 
 (5.91) (6.87) (5.89) (5.96) (6.00) 
London 901.611*** 814.585*** 854.868** 840.307** 873.883*** 
 (3.62) (3.45) (3.16) (3.10) (3.42) 
Size of university, 2013/14  -0.048**    
  (-3.20)    
growth of overall student 
numbers 2007/08 to 2013/14 
  -3.678   
   (-0.50)   
growth of undergrad numbers 
2007/08 to 2013/14 
   -4.438  
    (-0.60)  
growth of postgrad numbers 
2007/08 to 2013/14 
    -1.570 
     (-0.71) 
      
Constant 6750.578*** 6998.914*** 6793.458*** 6814.056*** 6773.407*** 
 (14.98) (18.39) (15.00) (15.16) (15.03) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.825 0.844 0.826 0.826 0.826 
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t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
Table 4: Regression models for teaching income per student, English universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
2008 RAE rank -35.533*** -14.618** -9.239* -3.265 -1.042 
 (-8.41) (-3.26) (-2.27) (-0.65) (-0.22) 
Type of university (reference: other pre-92 university) 
Russell Group   1685.261*** 1817.316***  1603.159*** 
  (3.42) (4.15)  (5.06) 
Post-92 university  -796.568* -966.214**  340.962 
  (-2.37) (-3.02)  (0.81) 
London   1282.076*** 870.097** 820.363** 
   (3.51) (2.96) (3.38) 
percentage of STEM     108.600** 76.815* 
    (3.16) (2.52) 
proportion 
international  
   107.942*** 107.349*** 
    (5.01) (5.84) 
University size    -0.017 -0.043* 
    (-1.12) (-2.49) 
Constant 11425.520*** 10142.984*** 9609.724*** 7143.178*** 7068.833*** 
 (30.22) (30.71) (33.41) (10.61) (13.34) 
Observations 93 93 93 93 93 
R2 0.560 0.650 0.721 0.794 0.852 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 5: Further regressions for teaching income per student in 2013/14, English universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
NSS score 131.330*** -45.637   
 (3.49) (-1.92)   
Guardian score   97.861*** 21.611 
   (8.17) (1.72) 
Type of university (reference: other pre-92 university) 
Russell Group   1684.077***  1546.818*** 
  (5.36)  (4.95) 
Post-92 university  171.351  447.224 
  (0.52)  (1.26) 
percentage of STEM   83.434**  56.043 
  (2.79)  (1.69) 
proportion 
international  
 114.867***  97.087*** 
  (7.58)  (5.23) 
London  682.205**  978.525*** 
  (2.98)  (4.20) 
University size  -0.053***  -0.039* 
  (-3.79)  (-2.47) 
Constant -1753.359 10921.015*** 3550.603*** 5931.387*** 
 (-0.56) (5.22) (5.61) (8.77) 
Observations 96 96 92 92 
R2 0.135 0.852 0.556 0.853 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 6: Further regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, English universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ranking: reference outside top 200, incl unranked 
Ranked in the top 50 5608.528*** 4233.352*** 2968.793*** 3243.441*** 2404.989*** 
 (7.60) (4.84) (4.76) (6.27) (3.83) 
Ranked top 200 (but outside top 50) 2184.784*** 930.222* 460.659 890.493** 366.822 
 (9.27) (2.38) (1.38) (3.36) (0.99) 
Type of university (reference: other pre-92 university) 
Russell Group university  402.042 567.745  869.792* 
  (1.15) (1.92)  (2.32) 
Post-92 university  -1216.417*** -88.704  159.759 
  (-3.62) (-0.31)  (0.50) 
Proportion international (non-EU) 
students 
  108.250*** 97.124*** 102.525*** 
   (6.24) (6.99) (6.23) 
Percentage of STEM in total FTE 
students (narrow defn) 
   36.554 42.235 
    (1.72) (1.78) 
London    552.770* 548.754* 
    (2.43) (2.60) 
University size    -0.021 -0.033* 
    (-1.75) (-2.60) 
Constant 8312.637*** 9285.770*** 7242.957*** 7317.909*** 7271.662*** 
 (68.35) (29.16) (20.58) (39.00) (19.83) 
Observations 96 96 96 96 96 
R2 0.680 0.733 0.868 0.881 0.890 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table 7:  Mean proportions of international and STEM students, in 2013/14, English universities 
Type of university Mean percentage of 
international (non-EU) 
students 
Mean percentage of 
STEM students 
(narrow definition) 
 % % 
Russell Group 23.88 14.06 
Other pre-92 20.17   8.90 
Post-92   8.45   2.98 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Some scenarios for 2 hypothetical English universities (one pre-92 and one post-92) not in the Russell Group  
 
Starting point Our hypothetical universities have the 
average of STEM and non-EU students 
typical for their sector 
Scenario 1 Boost proportion of STEM students to 
match Russell Group average 
Scenario 2 Boost proportion of non-EU students to 
match Russell Group average 
Scenario 3 Boost proportion of STEM and non-EU 
students so that each is at the Russell 
Group average 
Scenario 4 ‘Join’ the Russell Group i.e. gain prestige 
and reputation on a par with the Russell 
Group premium [but proportions of 
STEM and non-EU students as at starting 
point].  
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Table 9:  Gains for the 2 hypothetical English universities (one pre-92 and one post-92) under the various scenarios  
 Starting 
point 
Scenario 
1 
Scenario 
2 
Scenario 
3 
Scenario 
4 
 £ £ £ £ £ 
Russell Group 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 11,609 
Other pre-92 9,565 9,740 10,040 10,215 10,959 
Post-92 8,069 8,444 10,044 10,420 9,258 
      
As % RG % % % % % 
Other pre-92 82.4 83.9 86.5 88.0 94.4 
Post-92 69.5 72.7 86.5 89.8 79.7 
      
Gain on starting 
point 
% % % % % 
Other pre-92 0.0 1.8 5.0 6.8 14.6 
Post-92 0.0 4.7 24.5 29.1 14.7 
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Appendix: Regression results for UK universities 
Table A1: Regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, UK universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Type of university: reference is other pre-92 
Russell Group university 2096.305*** 1786.126*** 1403.671** 1371.717*** 1123.285*** 
 (4.12) (3.95) (3.21) (4.25) (3.64) 
      
Post-92 university -1239.482*** -1596.154*** -932.597** -646.328 -228.510 
 (-4.23) (-6.28) (-2.67) (-1.71) (-0.62) 
      
England  1648.380*** 1561.161*** 1450.887*** 1400.125*** 
  (5.50) (5.75) (4.24) (4.38) 
      
percentage of STEM in 
total FTE students 
(narrow defn) 
  99.417*  70.744* 
   (2.56)  (2.15) 
      
proportion international 
(non-EU) students 
   99.797*** 94.085*** 
    (4.02) (3.68) 
      
Constant 9092.404*** 8028.933*** 7160.153*** 6350.650*** 5828.490*** 
 (34.03) (22.91) (17.85) (15.92) (14.89) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
R2 0.461 0.576 0.614 0.722 0.741 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A2: Regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, UK universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Type of university: reference is other pre-92 
Russell Group university 1713.209** 1775.243*** 1154.458** 1126.634*** 1044.747** 
 (2.75) (4.43) (3.04) (3.85) (2.92) 
Post-92 university -1568.774*** -1491.818*** -235.769 -215.614 -196.296 
 (-5.19) (-6.15) (-0.65) (-0.66) (-0.62) 
England 1659.810*** 1326.451*** 1394.016*** 1183.441*** 1195.512*** 
 (5.47) (4.59) (4.23) (4.22) (4.11) 
Medical school 123.014  -58.380  153.472 
 (0.21)  (-0.14)  (0.40) 
London  1519.050***  1129.094*** 1149.878*** 
  (3.82)  (4.02) (4.08) 
percentage of STEM in 
total FTE students 
(narrow defn) 
  71.738* 88.683** 86.400** 
   (2.08) (2.91) (2.71) 
proportion international 
(non-EU) students 
  93.991*** 74.711** 74.603** 
   (3.70) (3.27) (3.22) 
Constant 7989.814*** 7991.621*** 5839.957*** 5969.797*** 5942.252*** 
 (19.46) (22.89) (15.57) (17.52) (18.19) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
R2 0.576 0.657 0.741 0.780 0.780 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
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Table A3: Regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, UK universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Russell Group university 1126.634*** 1391.182*** 1154.682*** 1133.972*** 1175.742*** 
 (3.85) (4.21) (3.79) (3.82) (3.97) 
Post-92 university -215.614 -104.318 -211.960 -218.911 -176.665 
 (-0.66) (-0.30) (-0.66) (-0.67) (-0.58) 
England 1183.441*** 1221.293*** 1185.774*** 1188.345*** 1171.756*** 
 (4.22) (4.34) (4.22) (4.18) (4.39) 
percentage of STEM in total 
FTE students (narrow defn) 
88.683** 98.833** 85.647** 86.945** 82.718** 
 (2.91) (3.29) (2.71) (2.78) (2.68) 
proportion international (non-
EU) students 
74.711** 76.373** 78.522*** 76.110** 83.813*** 
 (3.27) (3.26) (3.50) (3.35) (3.88) 
London 1129.094*** 1085.221*** 1057.224*** 1081.850*** 1028.397*** 
 (4.02) (3.91) (3.75) (3.75) (3.77) 
University size   -0.034*    
  (-2.14)    
growth of overall student 
numbers 2007/08 to 2013/14 
  -5.187   
   (-0.66)   
growth of undergrad numbers 
2007/08 to 2013/14 
   -3.328  
    (-0.45)  
growth of postgrad numbers 
2007/08 to 2013/14 
    -4.030 
     (-1.23) 
Constant 5969.797*** 6228.722*** 5991.408*** 5997.392*** 5937.519*** 
 (17.52) (20.68) (17.71) (17.56) (17.62) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 120 
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R2 0.780 0.789 0.781 0.780 0.787 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
Table A4: Regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, UK universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
RAE 2008 ranking -35.106*** -23.891*** -13.497** -8.538 0.800 
 (-8.96) (-4.42) (-3.00) (-1.74) (0.17) 
Type of university: reference is other pre-92 
Russell Group university  1426.544** 1430.089***  1178.760*** 
  (3.01) (3.50)  (3.87) 
Post-92 university  -117.402 -864.102**  -343.328 
  (-0.30) (-2.73)  (-1.11) 
England   1165.021*** 1144.985*** 1127.470*** 
   (4.14) (4.57) (4.24) 
London   1245.774** 957.184** 965.867*** 
   (3.35) (3.02) (3.43) 
percentage of STEM in 
total FTE students 
(narrow defn) 
   112.457*** 90.565** 
    (3.46) (2.74) 
proportion international 
(non-EU) students 
   77.992** 77.854** 
    (3.13) (3.27) 
growth of overall 
student numbers 
2007/08 to 2013/14 
   -6.530 -10.851 
    (-1.00) (-1.60) 
Constant 11133.286*** 10166.319*** 8756.559*** 6526.324*** 6061.013*** 
 (32.49) (30.60) (21.37) (11.87) (11.70) 
Observations 116 116 116 116 116 
R2 0.505 0.559 0.692 0.761 0.796 
t statistics in parentheses 
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* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
 
Table A5: Further regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, UK universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Student satisfaction, taught, 2011 130.480*** -21.759   
 (3.58) (-0.77)   
Type of university: reference is other pre-92 
Russell Group university  1136.943***  979.472** 
  (3.67)  (3.28) 
     
Post-92 university  -315.239  -22.134 
  (-0.96)  (-0.08) 
England  1197.610***  1025.328*** 
  (4.06)  (4.11) 
percentage of STEM in total FTE 
students (narrow defn) 
 92.051**  61.111 
  (2.77)  (1.83) 
proportion international (non-EU) 
students 
 78.446***  52.832* 
  (3.53)  (2.41) 
london  1007.550***  1307.615*** 
  (3.77)  (4.67) 
growth of overall student numbers 
2007/08 to 2013/14 
 -4.304  -3.898 
  (-0.52)  (-0.55) 
Guardian score 2012/13   100.532*** 39.761*** 
   (9.08) (3.44) 
Constant -1983.917 7805.116** 3135.921*** 4248.884*** 
 (-0.65) (3.30) (5.25) (7.67) 
Observations 119 119 116 116 
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R2 0.117 0.779 0.535 0.810 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
 
Table A6: Further regression models for teaching income per student in 2013/14, UK universities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ranking: reference outside top 200, incl unranked 
Ranked in the top 50 5347.669*** 4148.853*** 2827.898*** 2935.724*** 
 (6.88) (4.35) (4.30) (5.86) 
Ranked top 200 (but outside top 50) 1998.050*** 966.199* 620.084 774.751* 
 (7.44) (2.07) (1.75) (2.49) 
Type of university: reference is other pre-92 
Russell Group university  482.341 403.572  
  (1.08) (1.45)  
     
New university  -958.973** -678.058*  
  (-2.67) (-2.04)  
proportion international (non-EU) 
students 
  71.910** 69.490*** 
   (3.20) (3.47) 
England   1331.571*** 1252.585*** 
   (4.51) (5.30) 
     
London   696.781** 820.492** 
   (2.81) (3.02) 
percentage of STEM in total FTE 
students (narrow defn) 
   89.926** 
    (3.01) 
University size    -0.019 
    (-1.53) 
Constant 8095.421*** 8811.895*** 6639.803*** 6069.750*** 
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 (61.59) (26.09) (19.01) (27.07) 
Observations 120 120 120 120 
R2 0.553 0.592 0.806 0.824 
t statistics in parentheses 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001 
 
